Allegations that Chinese intelligence services targeted Nvidia’s recently departed CEO came as little surprise to Perry Link.
A distinguished professor emeritus at UC Riverside, Link has spent his career studying the literature, intellectual life, and politics of China. He is a noted translator and scholar of modern Chinese literature, co-editor of “The Tiananmen Papers,” and longtime critic of the Chinese Communist Party’s restrictions on free expression. He has witnessed some of the government’s methods firsthand.
By now, the contours of the scandal enveloping Nvidia, the dominant manufacturer of computer chips for artificial intelligence, are well known: Jensen Huang stepped down as the company’s CEO last week following revelations he had an affair with a woman believed to be a Chinese spy. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said Nov. 10 that the “allegation is totally unfounded and directed as smearing China.”
Link lived in China for roughly three years and visited the country frequently before its government barred him from entering in 1996. His experiences shed light on American concerns about Beijing’s pursuit of advanced U.S. technology. In an interview, he discussed China’s technological ambitions, spying methods, and political practices that indirectly suppress innovation.
This interview has been edited and condensed.
Q: You lived in Beijing in 1988 and 1989, directing a scientific-exchange program between the United States and China. What did that experience reveal about the Chinese government’s determination to acquire American scientific knowledge?
Link: The National Academy of Sciences asked me to serve for two years as director of its office in Beijing. I stayed only one year because of the Tiananmen massacre. During that time, I became friendly with Fang Lizhi, a prominent astrophysicist and dissident.
In February 1989, Fang and I were invited to a banquet hosted by President George H.W. Bush in Beijing. We planned to share a car, but Chinese security officers blocked us. We tried taxis and buses, but those were stopped, too. Eventually, we held a news conference about what had happened to us, which generated embarrassing international headlines for the Chinese government.
We expected retaliation, but nothing happened. Chinese friends with some inside knowledge told me the government didn’t want to jeopardize its scientific exchanges with the United States.
That was revealing. The Chinese government was so eager to acquire American scientific and technological knowledge that it apparently preferred to overlook the incident rather than risk disrupting those relationships. It showed me how deeply committed China was to catching up technologically.
In fact, the Chinese side wanted American science and technology so badly that, in exchange, we could negotiate opportunities for American scholars in the humanities and social sciences to come to China for interviews and fieldwork. For decades that had been impossible.
Q: Were you surveilled that day in February and later?
Link: On the streets of Beijing that night, plainclothes police followed immediately behind us. It couldn’t have been more obvious that we were being monitored, even harassed. At other times surveillance wasn’t so conspicuous, but I have no doubt my activities were monitored.
The NAS office I oversaw was required to have an assistant, supplied by the government, who answered the phone, sorted mail, and handled routine tasks. He wasn’t particularly bright or good at the work. I’m sure his duties included reporting on what we were doing.
After the Tiananmen massacre, I brought Fang to the U.S. Embassy where he sought refuge. He asked that his presence be kept confidential because he didn’t want the authorities to depict the student movement as directed by Americans. But senior diplomats couldn’t promise secrecy. They suspected the very room we were in might be bugged, and Chinese employees, who had been hired through Chinese government channels, had already seen him enter. His presence could not realistically be concealed.
Q: You’ve described China’s determination to catch up with the West in science and technology as rooted in a deep historical anxiety. Where does that come from?
Link: China’s effort to catch up with international science is 150 or 200 years old. It began in the 19th century, when British traders and gunboats reached China’s coast. Chinese political and intellectual leaders were shocked into realizing that other countries had developed superior military technologies, leading to China’s defeat in wars.
Some Chinese intellectuals adopted social Darwinist thinking, imagining a competition among nations in which only the fittest survived. Their fears were exaggerated, but these were genuine fears, and their legacy has lasted into the 21st century.
There was also a question of cultural pride. In the mid-19th century, China could still imagine itself as the center of the world. When suddenly it had to “catch up,” something seemed out of place in the world order. Today the country’s pursuit of military and economic strength is in part an effort to set things right globally.
Q: How does that history help explain China’s interest in advanced artificial intelligence and computer chips?
Link: The desire for advanced chips and the desire for international recognition are intertwined. Chinese officials want to demonstrate that their scientists are just as capable as anyone else. That helps explain the importance they attach to DeepSeek, the Chinese AI company whose models have been presented as an impressive, low-cost alternative to AI systems developed in the West.
From what I saw during my work with scientific exchanges in Beijing, it doesn’t surprise me that the Communist Party would want to do whatever it could to obtain cutting-edge chips.
Q: The allegations in the Nvidia scandal involve a suspected Chinese intelligence operative who reportedly developed an intimate relationship with one of America’s most powerful technology executives. How typical — or unusual — is it for China to conduct this kind of espionage?
Link: The use of the “honey-pot” trap is something that the CCP learned in the 1950s from the Soviet Union, where it was often used. It’s unclear whether Alice Huang, the suspect in this case, was trained by Chinese intelligence to start a relationship with Jensen Huang or went after Jensen Huang on her own — and later was recruited by the Chinese spy services. It is not 100% sure — but almost that sure — that she was indeed a CCP agent.
But really no one [in the West] has a systematic grasp of what the CCP calls “united front work” — the broad political strategy aimed at cultivating allies, influencing individuals and organizations, and neutralizing opposition to the party’s policies within China and abroad.
Q: Did Jensen Huang’s ethnicity — native Taiwanese — give China a greater sense of permission to target him?
Link: The CCP regards anyone who is ethnically Chinese as essentially “one of us” who, at some level, needs to listen to the CCP. This is not Jensen Huang’s fault, of course, but the answer to this question is yes.
Q: Is the goal of Chinese industrial espionage primarily to steal valuable information, or is the objective mainly to influence American business leaders and policymakers?
Link: Both are objectives.
Q: China has extraordinary scientific and engineering talent. What has prevented it from leading in technological innovation?
Link: University life and scientific research in China are heavily monitored and influenced by the government. At leading science and technical institutions, when researchers apply for government grants — and there is scarcely an alternative — bureaucrats rather than scientists make the funding decisions. Proposals must reflect official priorities, and often even include “our thanks to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Serious scientists give little credence to such jargon, but they do complain that writing proposals for the government is like “dancing in shackles.”
Outside China, venture capitalists might fund 50 startups, knowing that 48 could fail, because the two that succeed could become enormous businesses. That kind of competitive market for independent thinking doesn’t exist in the same way in China. It is important to recognize that the crucial difference between scientific innovation inside China and outside is determined by different political systems, not by the native talents of human beings. Many of the scientists at the forefront of discovery outside China are ethnically Chinese.
Q: Have you ever suspected that someone was trying to win your trust on behalf of Chinese authorities?
Link: Oh, yes, quite a few times. Sometimes people approach me in unusual ways, and I can’t really discern where they are coming from.
They might begin with flattery: “Professor Link, I’ve seen you on YouTube. You always tell the truth. I trust you completely, unlike those other foreign experts.” It’s as though I’m supposed to trust them because they flatter me.
Near the beginning of my time at the NAS office, a young man appeared who presented himself as a fervent dissident. He wasn’t connected to other dissidents I knew, and his denunciations of the government were unusually strident. He stayed in touch for a few months, then abruptly disappeared. I wondered whether he believed what he was saying or was trying to win my confidence by repeating pro-dissident views. I still don’t know.
I also receive unexpected requests to support asylum applications. Some are certainly genuine. But I often cannot tell.
Q: How might Chinese citizens abroad become sources of information for the Ministry of State Security?
Link: There’s a spectrum. At one end are recruited spies who are sent to countries to ingratiate themselves, or perhaps use gentle blackmail, to obtain information the government wants. That’s a small minority of cases.
For others, there can be two incentives for reporting back to Chinese intelligence. One is protecting themselves or family members in China. Another is to receive credit with the government for doing something considered “patriotic.”
Q: Have you seen the effects of that kind of pressure among Chinese students in your classes?
Link: Very much so. My Chinese students in contemporary literature would do the reading, and they would submit thoughtful papers. But they wouldn’t talk about subjects the government had declared to be “sensitive.” Sometimes, they even steered clear of subjects that shouldn’t have been sensitive, because they feared somebody might interpret them that way.
This happened not because they knew of another student in the class acting as a spy. I’ve never seen that particular fear conclusively established. But there may be a dozen other students from China in the room whom they don’t know. They’ve heard of cases where somebody says the wrong thing in an American classroom, and that student’s parents in China get a knock on the door.
Parents worry; students feel guilty. Uncertainty strengthens the pressure. In office hours, many would open up and criticize the government. They wouldn’t do it in class.
Q: What did your experience being denied visas to China reveal about the power of the Ministry of State Security?
Link: In 2002, I applied for a visa with the sponsorship of an influential Chinese official. My letter of appeal went as far as China’s premier, Zhu Rongji. Zhu asked the ministries of Culture and of Foreign Affairs to opine, and both favored allowing me a visa, but the Ministry of State Security said no. I haven’t seen the ministry’s letter, but passages were read to me over the phone. It said something to the effect that because of the continuing complexity of the international situation, Link and 17 others should not be allowed in for the time being. I don’t know who the others were.
Even China’s premier couldn’t override the decision of the Chinese intelligence services.
Q: Did being on China’s blacklist ever present unusual scenarios for you?
Link: Yes. Here’s one: In 2013, I received an invitation from the Chinese Embassy in Washington to an international conference of sinologists in Beijing. I asked if it was genuine, given my blacklisting, and the person insisted it was. I offered to send my passport to the embassy for a visa.
I sent it by overnight delivery. Within 48 hours, I received a terse email: “Upon review, you are not invited to the conference.” My interpretation is that the scholars who invited me genuinely wanted an intellectual exchange, and the staffer in the embassy hadn’t done enough homework on my blacklisting. Once he did, he had to back off.
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